Transient Signals and Inattentional Blindness in a Multi-Object Tracking Task by Palmer, Dakota B. et al.
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology
2018
Transient Signals and Inattentional Blindness in a
Multi-Object Tracking Task
Dakota B. Palmer
Old Dominion University, dpalm010@odu.edu
Yusuke Yamani
Old Dominion University, yyamani@odu.edu
Taylor L. Bobrow
Old Dominion University, tbobr001@odu.edu
Nicole D. Karpinsky
Old Dominion University, nkarp001@odu.edu
Dean J. Krusienski
Old Dominion University, dkrusien@odu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/psychology_fac_pubs
Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Repository Citation
Palmer, Dakota B.; Yamani, Yusuke; Bobrow, Taylor L.; Karpinsky, Nicole D.; and Krusienski, Dean J., "Transient Signals and
Inattentional Blindness in a Multi-Object Tracking Task" (2018). Psychology Faculty Publications. 18.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/psychology_fac_pubs/18
Original Publication Citation
Palmer, D. B., Yamani, Y., Bobrow, T. L., Karpinsky, N. D., & Krusienski, D. J. (2018). Transient signals and inattentional blindness in a
multi-object tracking task. i-perception, 9(1), 1-9. doi:10.1177/2041669518754595
Short Report
Transient Signals and
Inattentional Blindness in a
Multi-object Tracking Task
Dakota B. Palmer and Yusuke Yamani
Department of Psychology, Old Dominion University, VA, USA
Taylor L. Bobrow
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Old Dominion
University, VA, USA
Nicole D. Karpinsky
Department of Psychology, Old Dominion University, VA, USA
Dean J. Krusienski
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Old Dominion
University, VA, USA
Abstract
Inattentional blindness is a failure to notice an unexpected event when attention is directed
elsewhere. The current study examined participants’ awareness of an unexpected object that
maintained luminance contrast, switched the luminance once, or repetitively flashed. One
hundred twenty participants performed a dynamic tracking task on a computer monitor for
which they were instructed to count the number of movement deflections of an attended set
of objects while ignoring other objects. On the critical trial, an unexpected cross that did not
change its luminance (control condition), switched its luminance once (switch condition), or
repetitively flashed (flash condition) traveled across the stimulus display. Participants noticed the
unexpected cross more frequently when the luminance feature matched their attention set than
when it did not match. Unexpectedly, however, a proportion of the participants who noticed the
cross in the switch and flash conditions were statistically comparable. The results suggest that an
unexpected object with even a single luminance change can break inattentional blindness in a multi-
object tracking task.
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Inattentional blindness (IB) occurs when an observer fails to notice conspicuous events or
objects when their attention is directed elsewhere (Chabris, Weinberger, Fontaine, & Simons,
2011; Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Most, Scholl, Jimenez,
Clifford, & Chabris, 2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons, 2000). IB can arise even with a
direct fixation at an unexpected object (Drew, Vo˜, & Wolfe, 2013; Memmert, 2006), which
suggests that IB arises not due to lack of direct fixations but from postsensory processes.
Even expert observers and professional practitioners (Drew et al., 2013; Memmert, 2006), as
well as those who are familiar with the phenomenon (Simons, 2010), are not immune to the
effect of IB. In the real world, IB can lead to critical failures and have disastrous outcomes in
professional tasks, such as piloting a vehicle (Fischer, Haines, & Price, 1980) or screening
medical scans for abnormalities (Potchen, 2006). Thus, understanding the mechanisms
underlying IB may help visual display designers for transportation and health-care systems
select effective visual alerts that break operators’ IB.
Experimentally, Mack and Rock (1998) demonstrated IB in their static IB paradigm.
In their experiment, observers were asked to judge which arm of a cross that was briefly
presented at the center of the display was shorter. In a critical trial, an unexpected object
appeared simultaneously with the cross, and observers reported whether they saw anything
unusual after the completion of the trial. Approximately 25% of the observers failed to report
the presence of the unexpected object, showing IB even in a simple perceptual task.
Surprisingly, color changes and movements of the unexpected object did not entirely
eliminate IB (Mack & Rock, 1998), suggesting that object saliency itself does not always
capture observers’ attention (see Simons, 2000 for review).
More recently, Most et al. (2001; also 2005) showed that not only do bottom-up factors
such as saliency of an unexpected object influence IB, but top-down factors such as attention
sets influence IB in a dynamic multi-object tracking task. Participants were asked to view a
dynamic visual display consisting of white and black circles and squares moving on random
trajectories and to count the number of times either white or black objects deflected off the
side of the display boundary while fixating at the center point of the display. Following two
standard trials, on the third critical trial, an unexpected object which was visible for 5 seconds
entered the display from the right side and traveled on a straight path through the center of
the screen, exiting on the left side. The features of the unexpected critical stimulus such as
shape, color, and luminance were systematically manipulated in a series of their experiments.
After the critical trial, participants were asked if they noticed anything unusual and, if so, to
describe what they saw. Depending on the unexpected object’s properties and their attention
sets, as many as 100% of participants failed to notice it. Note that these participants detected
the critical object in the following full attention trial, where they were asked to fixate on the
display center without performing the tracking task. Strikingly, Most et al.’s (2001) showed
that the probability of noticing an unexpected object depends on similarity between visual
features of an unexpected object and those in participants’ attention set.
Thus, Most et al. (2001) showed that the probability of noticing unexpected objects
depends on the degree of correspondence between an observer’s attention set and the
stimulus property of an unexpected object. However, whether a highly salient, unexpected
object overrides the top-down influence on attention and allows observers to notice the object
remains unclear. Previous research indicates that highly salient and unexpected events do not
necessarily promote visual awareness while performing a primary monitoring task (Simons &
Chabris, 1999). Extending Mack and Rock’s (1998) study, Simons and Chabris (1999) asked
participants to watch videos showing two teams of three players in black or white shirts
(black vs. white teams) and silently count the number of passes made by one of two teams. In
the middle of the tape, an experimenter wearing a gorilla costume (in black) entered from the
2 i-Perception
left side of the action, thumped its chest, and then continued across the field of view. Results
not only indicated that roughly half of participants failed to detect the Gorilla but also
corroborated the attention set account of IB (Most et al., 2001) in that twice more number
of participants noticed the Gorilla in the black condition than the white condition. Such
results highlight the possibility that saliency of an unexpected event influences visual
awareness more strongly when properties of the event match with participants’ attention set.
The current study aims to replicate the findings of Most et al. (2001) and examine the
effects of levels of object saliency on visual awareness in a dynamic multi-object tracking task.
We manipulated observers’ attention set (track black or white objects while ignoring white or
black objects, respectively) and salience of an unexpected moving object (constant, switch, or
flash). The unexpected object did not change its luminance (the constant condition), switched
its luminance once (the switch condition), or flashed repetitively (the flash condition) in the
tasks. We predicted that participants would notice the unexpected object more frequently in
the flash condition than the switch condition, because the repetitive flashes create more
frequent transient signals than the single switch. Furthermore, we predicted that
participants would notice the unexpected object more frequently in the switch condition
than the constant condition.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty participants (96 females; mean age¼ 21.17 years, SD¼ 5.81; mean near
visual acuity¼ 20/22.75; mean far visual acuity¼ 20/21.27) were recruited from the
community of Old Dominion University. This study was reviewed and approved by the
institutional review board at Old Dominion University. All participants were screened for
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and normal color perception. They received a research
participation credit for their participation.
Stimuli
Following Most et al.’s (2001) methodology, each stimulus display contained four circle and
four square objects on a gray background (luminance¼ 32.1 cd/m2) with a blue fixation point
at the center of the display. One group of objects was colored black (luminance¼ 1.5 cd/m2)
while the other was colored white (luminance¼ 88.0 cd/m2).
Figure 1 illustrates a sample of the stimulus display. During the task, the objects moved
across random paths at a variable rate ranging from 2 to 5 per second. The moving objects
deflected at the display boundaries such that the angle of reflection was equal to the angle of
incidence with the boundary.
In the critical trials, a cross with the same horizontal and vertical dimensions as circles and
squares (1.0  1.0) moved horizontally and linearly across the center of the screen in front of
the fixation point from right to left. The luminance value of the cross remained the same
(control condition), changed from white to black or black to white (switch condition),
or rapidly alternated between black and white (flashing condition; frequency¼ 7.5 Hz, mean
luminance¼ 14.1 cd/m2) through its path. Each of precritical and critical trials lasted 15 seconds.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions: Control,
Switch, or Flashing. Within each condition, half of the participants attended to black objects
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while the others attended to white objects. Participants were instructed to maintain gaze on
the fixation point, attend to target objects (black vs. white), and count the number of times
target objects deflected off the display boundaries. Although participants were instructed to
maintain their gaze on the central fixation point while completing the tracking task, we did
not use eye-tracking to ensure this was the case, as IB is shown to arise even when observers
directly fixate at unexpected objects (e.g., Drew et al., 2013; Mack & Rock, 1998).
Each trial began with the objects at random initial positions and central fixation point
appearing in the visual display and motionless for 1 second. The objects then moved
throughout the visual display until the trial ended. Participants completed a sequence of six
experimental trials. The fifth and sixth trials contained the critical object. Five seconds after the
beginning of the fifth and sixth trials, the critical cross entered and was visible for 5 seconds.
At the end of each critical trial, participants were asked to report whether an unusual event
occurred during the trial to gauge their awareness of the critical event. Pressing ‘‘1’’ on the
numeric keypad indicated that they detected an unusual event (presumably the cross) and ‘‘2’’
otherwise. If participants indicated that something unusual occurred, they were asked to
report a description of the unusual event they perceived.
The sixth trial was a full attention trial, in which participants were instructed to passively
view the display while fixating on the central fixation point, rather than counting the number
of times objects deflected off the display boundaries. The full attention trial was performed to
ensure that participants were able to perceive the object when attention was not diverted.
Thus, data from those who failed to observe the critical object on the sixth trial were removed
from the analysis. At the end of all trials except for the full attention trial, participants were
Figure 1. An example of the visual display in a critical event trial. Circle and square objects move randomly
while an unexpected object flickering at 7.5Hz enters from the right side of the display, over the middle
fixation point, and exits the left side of the display.
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asked to report the total number of times target objects deflected off the edges of the display
by typing the number using the numeric keypad when prompted. Participants then received
feedback regarding accuracy in the counting task after each trial for 750 milliseconds,
consisting of correct or incorrect with the actual correct number of deflections.
Statistical Analyses
Instead of the standard null hypothesis significance tests, we employed default Bayesian tests
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) using BayesFactor package in R (Morey,
Rouder, & Jamil, 2015). The default Bayesian tests can provide evidence for the null
hypothesis and Bayes factors provide a meaningful measure of evidence strength. The
measure of evidence strength is B10, denoting the ratio of the likelihood that data support
an alternative model that includes an effect of interest to the likelihood that data support the
null model that excludes the effect. For example, a Bayes factor of 3 indicates that
an alternative model is 3 times more likely resulting from the data than the null model,
while a Bayes factor of 1/3 indicates substantial evidence for the null model over an
alternative model. Descriptive terms for each comparison come from Jeffreys (1961) and
Wetzels et al. (2011).
Results and Discussion
Data from 15 participants were removed from the analysis due to failure to report the
unexpected cross in the full attention trial. Table 1 presents the number of participants who
noticed the unexpected cross across the three conditions. Omnibus analysis showed comparable
noticing rates across the three experimental conditions, 2(2)¼ 3.46, B10¼ 1/5.40. However, the
results show that participants from the control condition noticed the unexpected cross more
frequently when the luminance of the cross matched with their attention set, replicating Most
et al. (2001). When attending to black objects, all the participants noticed the black cross while
57% of them noticed the white cross, and the data gave substantial evidence for a difference,
Table 1. Number of Participants on the Three Experimental Conditions Who Noticed the
Unexpected Cross in the Critical and Full-Attention Attention Trials.
Unexpected object Attention set n
Trial type
Critical Full attention
Control
Black objects White objects 10 5 7
Black objects 10 10 9
White objects White objects 10 9 7
Black objects 10 5 7
Switch
Black to White White objects 10 7 9
Black objects 10 9 10
White to Black White objects 10 9 9
Black objects 10 9 10
Flashing
Flashing White objects 20 18 19
Black objects 20 19 18
Palmer et al. 5
2(1)¼ 2.35, B10¼ 4.85. Similarly, when attending to white objects, all the participants noticed
the white cross while 42% of them noticed the black cross, which again provided strong
evidence for a difference, 2(1)¼ 3.15, B10¼ 7.80.
Contrary to our expectation, the single transient signal of the unexpected luminance-
switching cross produced rates of response comparable to those with the highly salient
flashing cross (86% vs. 91% for the switch and flash conditions, respectively), 2(1)¼ .50,
B10¼ 1/4.50. Furthermore, the data also gave substantial evidence that target type (white or
black) does not influence rates of noticing (B10¼ 1/3.16 and B10¼ 1/3.96 for the switch and
flash conditions, respectively). Within the switch condition, the data produced substantial
evidence against the effect of the order of the luminance change (white to black vs. black to
white) on rates of noticing, 2(1)¼ .23, B10¼ 1/3.38.
To compare between the control and switch conditions more directly, we compared the
proportions of responders when the luminance of the cross matched with their attention
set (the match condition) and when it did not (the mismatch condition) in the control
condition separately to the proportion of responders in the switch condition. Data showed
anecdotal trends in favor of the null when comparing the match condition to the switch
condition, 2(1)¼ .91, B10¼ 1/2.02. However, data provided strong evidence that the
switch condition produced a greater noticing rate than the mismatch condition, 2(1)¼
5.88, B10¼ 10.85.
There are three points to highlight from the results. First, using Most et al.’s (2001) multi-
object tracking paradigm, we replicated the effect of attention set on visual awareness.
Compared to the proportions of participants reported in Most et al. (2001, Experiment 1),
the effect of attention set was, though statistically reliable, markedly smaller in the current
study. The smaller number of participants in the control condition in the current study
(N¼ 31), as opposed to Most et al.’s (2001) study (N¼ 145), could have contributed to the
discrepancy between the two studies.
Second, the results imply that the participants noticed the cross because luminance of
the object matched with the attention set for a half of the time during the critical trial in
the switch and the flash conditions. Participants attending to white objects, for example,
might have noticed the cross on the switch or flash condition because the luminance of the
cross was white half of the time that the critical display contained the cross. Future research
should investigate the relationship between visual awareness and the influence of the amount
of time that features of an unexpected target match with those in participants’ attention
set when the features of the target vary dynamically in a multi-object tracking task.
One alternative account of the current results is that transient signals captured attention.
Thus, additional research can directly investigate the effects of transient signals of an
unexpected object by manipulating the number of transient signals on IB while controlling
the amount of time that the luminance of the unexpected object matches with participants’
attention set.
Finally, it should be noted that the current results are not likely due to an inadequate
sample size or a ceiling effect. The experiments reported in Most et al. (2005) used 20.5
participants in each group on average, which is comparable to the current study.
Furthermore, the counting accuracy data showed that participants’ tracking performance
was substantially poorer in the flash condition than the control condition, independent-
samples t(70)¼ 2.45, B10¼ 3.07, and that performance in the switch condition was
statistically equivalent to that in the control condition (B10¼ 1/4.18), indicating that the
switch and flash conditions were no easier than the control condition. Nonetheless, future
research may reduce noticing rates by making the unexpected object smaller and move faster.
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